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Welcome to the Histories
Welcome again to another issue of the Histories! For those of you who are
unfamiliar with this journal, the Histories is an organization that is dedicated to
educating all Lasallians about historical topics through scholarly historical research
articles and photographs. It is our hope that we can deliver to you the same
quality product that we did last year.
As with all student journals, an evolution in format and content is inevitable.
In terms of this year’s format, this issue hopes to take on a sleeker look, one that
will hopefully be pleasing to the superficial eye as well as to the deeply intuitive
thoughts of the mind. Likewise, our issue is comprised of a vast array of historical
subjects. The Histories intends to cover social, military, religious, and political
topics in this issue.
Lastly, I would like to thank all those individuals who have contributed to
the Histories in a number of ways. I would like to thank our History Department for
its support of this magazine. Without their encouragement, the Histories would cease
to be. I would also like to thank our writers for their contributions. Also, I greatly
appreciated the advice and financial assistance given to me by Chris Kazmierczak.
Finally, I want to thank the La Salle community for accepting this journal as its own.
As a senior, I now understand what it means to leave a Lasallian legacy. I can only
hope that the future of this magazine will be as bright as its past.

Editor-in-chief
Matthew Joseph Smalarz

WRITERS: Tony Giammarco, Kristen Hess, Matthew Kowalski, Matthew
Smalarz
MODERATORS: Dr. Charles Desnoyers, Dr. Stuart Leibiger, Prof.
Jeffrey LaMonica
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Fleming vs. Florey: It A ll Comes Down to the M old
Kristen Hess
Without penicillin, the world as it is known today would not exist. Simple
infections, earaches, menial operations, and diseases, like syphilis and pneumonia,
would possibly all end fatally, shortening the life expectancy of the population,
affecting everything from family-size and marriage to retirement plans and insurance
policies. So how did this “wonder drug” come into existence and who is behind the
development of penicillin? The majority of the population has heard the “Eureka!”
story of Alexander Fleming and his famous petri dish with the unusual mold growth,
Penicillium notatum. Very few realize that there are not only different variations
of the Fleming discovery but that there are also other people who were vitally
important to the development of penicillin as an effective drug. This paper will
focus on the discovery of penicillin by Alexander Fleming and the subsequent
controversy that entails over the ‘Fleming Myth.’
Coming from a large farming family, Alexander Fleming has ample
chances to discover nature in its purest form and to develop a keen interest in
science. His decision to go to medical school and become a bacteriologist led him
to St. Mary’s Medical School, London University. After graduation, he served in
the Royal Army Corp before returning to St. Mary’s to teach and do further
experimentation. (Rowland, The Penicillin Man) While doing experiments
using Staphyloccus bacteria, Fleming discovered lysozyme, an enzyme within the
human body capable of fighting infections and destroying certain bacteria. This
discovery was purely coincidental when he supposedly sneezed on a plate of
bacteria and some of his mucous landed on the plate killing the bacteria around it.
This observation proved important in analyzing the body’s defense mechanisms.
He furthered his lysozyme work, which grew out of his interest in showing the
ineffectiveness of chemical antiseptics to treat infection. Fleming believed it was
more important to enhance the body’s own natural immune responses to treat
disease. (Friedman, 168-181) It is also at St. Mary’s, in 1928, where Fleming
discovered the saving mold.
Two accounts exist pertaining to the actual discovery of the mold. Both
focus on Fleming’s untidy work habits and lack of sterile working conditions.
Some sources suggest that the dedication and work ethic of Alexander Fleming
drove him to go work one day even though he was covered in boils. At lunchtime,
Fleming supposedly found a moldy sandwich, and having nothing else, he ate it
and found his boils were cured shortly thereafter. Using this as a basis, Fleming
began experimentation using the mold in hopes of discovering what led to his
recovery. This has only been quoted a few times and seems to be the least reliable
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of the two recollections.
More sources recall that on the day before he went on a two-week vacation,
Fleming prepared petri dishes of bacteria cultures he wanted to grow over the break.
Unbeknownst to him, a Penicillium notatum spore from a laboratory on the next floor
landed on one of the plates. [The laboratory upstairs did not have a working hood
over the lab bench, and the scientist was therefore forced to work under sloppy
conditions, with the spores able to freely move about based on air circulation.]
Because the vacation was two weeks long, Fleming noted he did not have to put the
plates in the incubator to speed the growth; the time period would be such that the
bacteria would flourish on their own. This was a fortunate occurrence because the
penicillium spore would have died in the incubator and would not have been
detected. Upon returning to the lab, Fleming found his Staphloccus bacteria had
grown very well on all the petri dishes but one. One had a fuzzy greenish mold
growing in it and the area around the mold was void of bacteria.
The discovery of the green mold surrounded by the yellow halo void of
bacteria is often described as the “Eureka!” moment of Fleming’s career. When
asked about what he thought about that special moment, he said, “My only merit
is that I did not neglect the observation and that 1 pursued the subject as a
bacteriologist.” (Ho, 117-123) This stems from the fact that the ability of
Penicillium notatum to kill bacteria had been noted by two other scientists: John
Tyndall in 1875 and D.A. Gratia in 1925. Both scientists found the observation
intriguing but did not follow it up with any further experimentation; believing
simply that the substance would be of interest only to fellow scientists and not to
the rest of the world. Fleming, however, decided to experiment with the mold and
found out what other bacteria it would affect. He found that the Penicillium
notatum killed streptococcus, staphylococcus, pneunococcus, gonococcus,
meningococcus, and diphtheria bacteria. This information led Fleming to believe
the penicillin had potential as a local antiseptic in order to treat wounds and
concentrated diseases.

Alexander Fleming: The Man responsible for discovering Penicillin
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Fleming had two assistants who helped him with the penicillin
experiments: Frederick Ridley and Stuart Craddock. These two were in charge
of finding more of the properties of the mold, doing toxicity tests, and using the
mold grown in broth to put on local wounds. Fleming did titrations, a procedure
used in determining acidic and basic properties of a substance, with their
experimental results and then decided to inject some of the broth into living
animals - a rabbit and a mouse. In using live animals he made an error - he did
not use animals that were infected with a bacteria; rather he used healthy
animals just to see if any penicillin would have any effect on their biological
systems. He noted that in the presence of blood and serum the Penicillium
notatum lost a large percentage of its activity; consequently, Fleming incorrectly
assumed that penicillin would be unsuitable for use in a living organism. Had he
injected it into an infected animal the potential of penicillin to kill bacteria could
have been realized earlier; instead it was left untested at this point. Fleming did
write an article about his findings to date and stated, “It has been used in a number
of indolent septic wounds and has certainly appeared to be superior to dressings
containing potent chemicals.” (MacFarlane, 139) In the summer of 1929, Fleming
abandoned his research on penicillin because he was not a chemist and he was
having difficulty isolating and identifying the active component involved.

Ernst Boris Chain

Sir Howard Walter Florey

It was now in the overall scheme of things, that other people became
intimately involved in experimenting with penicillin and from this controversy
inevitably arose. Howard Walter Florey took over as the Chair of the Pathology
Department at Oxford University. He was looking for a project to revitalize the
program and he stumbled across the work of Alexander Fleming. Florey felt
lysozyme appeared to hold medicinal importance, seeing as it had once
demonstrated the ability to destroy bacteria and that it existed in multiple bodily
fluids. Florey got right to work on more experiments with lysozyme and hired
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Ernst Boris Chain to help him with the chemistry aspects of the experiments.
While doing research for the project, Chain found Fleming’s paper on the
possibilities of penicillin and the two scientists decided to take on that project
instead. Fleming did not publish all the information about the random
experiments he had his assistants do with penicillin, leaving Chain and Florey
with little to go on. The two men had no alternative but to test and learn
by trial and error. Chain was responsible for purifying and identifying the
active principle of penicillin and toiled numerous hours doing so. There were
other members of the Oxford team who also participated' N. G. Heatley
(production work), A. G. Sanders (pathologist), A. D. Gardener (bactericidal
work) as well as some lab hands. This was an incredibly large investment both
in time and energy for a Chair (Florey) to put into a project - had it failed
miserably the consequences, undoubtedly, would have been dire.
The team isolated penicillin in 1939 and began proving its safety and
efficacy. Florey had always been a big promoter of simply doing the experiment
instead of wasting time hypothesizing. Fie promptly set up a trial involving eight
mice - all infected with bacteria. Four of the mice were given doses of penicillin
and four were left alone as control mice. The four treated mice lived and the
other four lasted a few days before dying. Before allowing themselves to get
excited, the two researchers did the experiment over - this time with ten mice
and again the five treated mice lived and the five control mice died. Based on
these findings the team published an article in The Lancet entitled, “Penicillin
a Chemotherapeutic Agent,” on August 24, 1940. After reading of the Oxford
team’s article, Fleming decided to pay them a visit. When Chain found out
Fleming was coming he supposedly said, “Fleming? Good God, I thought he was
dead!” When Fleming showed up at the lab he said, “I’ve come to see what you’ve
been doing with my old penicillin.” (Parshall, 58-63) It was these words that
provoked a bit of controversy. Even though Fleming can be credited with
discovering the agent, the Oxford team felt that after all their hard work and
difficulties, they too had rights to penicillin. No harsh words or ill feelings were
exchanged at this meeting, however, and Fleming gladly walked the laboratory and
took note of their experiments and latest findings.
The meeting with Fleming had no effect on the actions of the Oxford team;
they continued to do experimentation and decided to take it a step further by actually
seeing the effects of penicillin in a human being. Because they did not think it
prudent to inject a healthy person in case of adverse side effects, they used a
terminally ill patient who was supposed to die within two months and who agreed
to it, Mrs. Akers. The effects penicillin had on her were not promising - she merely
had a slight seizure. A second patient, Albert Alexander, who had developed a
bacterial infection after getting a small scratch from a rosebush in his garden,
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normalized after being given penicillin but the supply ran out and he died soon
after. Various other tests were done, leading the team to publish their second article
in August 1941 in The Lancet - “Further Observations on Penicillin” which
included details about techniques for developing cultures of the mold, extracting the
active ingredient, purifying the penicillin and then testing it. The results were
proving optimistic and Florey decided he needed financial aid to get penicillin
production underway in hopes of aiding the war effort. Because the financial
burden of World War II was less strenuous on the United States in the beginning
of the war, U.S. labs were continuing experimentation and financial backers were
willing to aid the research. Florey received the money from the Rockefeller Fund
and began producing penicillin as fast as possible.
Meanwhile, Fleming, who for the most part had taken a spectator seat
during all this experimentation and development of his “discovery,” decided things
were looking up for his ‘old penicillin’ and therefore began to emphasize his rights
on penicillin. The articles that came out about the new findings were responded
to by a regurgitation of his original conclusion in regards to penicillin and its
possible medicinal use, “suggested that it may be an efficient antiseptic for
application to, or injection into, areas infected with penicillin-sensitive microbes.”
(MacFarlane, 188) Fleming felt it necessary to make sure people remembered that
he was the one who first realized the potential of penicillin. Slowly he was
integrating himself back into the picture after his ten-year hiatus. When one of
his close friends was taken ill, Fleming called on Florey and asked for a supply of
penicillin for the patient. Florey answered and gave direction for dosage etc.
The patient was cured and Fleming was finally able to place confidence in his
discovery. He then began supporting mass production of penicillin for medical
purposes and the public caught wind of the story.
Publications began to appear with stories of the “wonder drug” and the
amazing recoveries that happened because of it. When an article appeared without
giving credit to any one person for penicillin, Sir Amroth Wright took action and
wrote a letter into The Times stating that, “... it should be decreed to Professor
Alexander Fleming of this research laboratory. For he is the discoverer of
penicillin and was the author of the original suggestion that the substance
may have medical importance.” In response, letters came in giving Florey credit
saying, “...if the laurel wreath was to be given to Fleming then Florey deserved a
bouquet at least, and a handsome one too.” (MacFarlane, 198) The press bombarded
the two researchers; Fleming welcomed the attention and allowed pictures to be
taken and stories ran. Flroey, on the other hand, was skeptical of publicity on his
project and then was ruined when his experiment did not come out as expected.
Florey may have also been hesitant because he was afraid the great publicity would
create a demand for penicillin that could not possibly be met, seeing as production
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was slow and tedious. The reporters had to report on the information that they
were given and it was Alexander Fleming that welcomed them with open arms.
(Goldworthy, 176-178) It is with this that the Fleming story erupted.
Alexander Fleming had not been an active participant in the quest for
medicinal penicillin for ten years and all of sudden he found himself in the middle
of a media swarm. There was a constant demand for Fleming to appear in public both to receive awards, present awards, give inspirational speeches, and talk of
his discovery of penicillin. The favorite way the media liked to portray him
was a hero figure. The ‘hero’ figure is a result of the exaggeration by the media
not only of Fleming’s original discovery but also of the subsequent years when
he literally stopped work on penicillin. Pictures of the original plate of bacteria
with the mold growth on it circulated. Publicity began hitting the press about
how Fleming was simply brimming with anticipation during the years he was
not working on penicillin, waiting for the world to accept his findings and
realize his genius. As is the case with journalism, the world saw the headlines
and read the stories and attached onto Fleming as a brilliant scientist, making
his name synonymous with penicillin. Every patient that received penicillin was
quoted as saying, “Thank you Alexander Fleming!”
At first Fleming laughed at all the publicity. He clipped the newspaper
articles and pictures and continued about his work trying not to draw so much
attention to himself. Any time it was appropriate, Fleming mentioned the
contributions of Florey and the Oxford team. He stated, “... although my work
started you [Florey] off on the penicillin hunt, it was you who made a practical
proposition and it is good that you get the credit.” The two men mutually
exchanged thanks and appreciative letters. Soon enough though, Fleming found
himself overwhelmed with social obligations - he constantly was being awarded
honorary degrees and giving lectures. There was little time left for his actual work.
The continuous adoration of Fleming by the public began to gnaw at the nerves of
Florey, who managed to hold his tongue but was generally aggravated by the
situation. The closest he came to publicly downplaying Fleming’s discovery was
when he was quoted as saying, “In 1940, the first observations on penicillin were
published...up to this time the real nature of penicillin has escaped detection.”
(Parshall, 58-63) All the members of the Oxford team felt slighted at the lack of
recognition being given to them. Chain was especially upset because he had urged
Florey to get a patent on penicillin and Florey had felt it would not be fair to
monopolize a scientific discovery - exactly what was happening with Fleming.
[John Sheehan of a United States institution was the first to synthesize penicillin
and; consequently obtained a patent for penicillin in 1957.] The glorified hero
story of Fleming’s discovery was taking all the limelight.
People could not believe how unselfish and altruistic Fleming was - he
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had not even made money off of his discovery and yet people’s lives were being
saved! Donations began flowing into the newspaper publishers and people
willingly gave money to support awards to Fleming. It was easier for people to
comprehend the deductive insight of a single individual than the technical feats
of a team of scientists. (MacFarlane, 198) Florey had always placed strong
emphasis on the teamwork factor involved in the experimentation and discovery.
This attitude was not as understood by the general public who appreciated the
idea of one lone genius. Florey’s desire for privacy allowed Fleming to take
center stage.
In the midst of all the publicity, it appeared that Alexander Fleming was
taking more credit for more than he was due or at least that he was not actively
trying to set the story straight. Was he a conniving man that longed for attention
that he felt he would never get otherwise? Or was he just human and enjoying
the fame bestowed on him by the public, although inwardly realizing the depth
of his contribution vs. the contributions of the Oxford team? Those closest to
Fleming felt he was a man of good character that honestly did not realize that
there was any slight being committed. Everyone who knew him generally spoke
of him highly - not only for his scientific insight but also for his social skills in
games and after dinner drinks. He was described as easy-going, modest,
uncritical, and gregarious. His meek mannerism and far-from commanding
presence left one liking Fleming right from the start. When awarded the Nobel
Prize in 1945 along with Florey and Chain, he disclosed to one friend that he
felt he might not deserve such esteem. Fleming admitted, however, that he
enjoyed the publicity and was excited at the momentum from the public over
his discovery. The source reiterated that one could not help but see how sincere
Fleming was in these comments.
Meanwhile, the Oxford team believed the publicity was all contrived and
that behind it was a dishonest campaign trying to credit Fleming and therefore get
financial aid to St. Mary’s. They felt their anger was justified mainly by the fact that
Fleming was not awarded the Nobel Prize when he first discovered penicillin but
was only awarded it after the Oxford team had proved its importance and developed
penicillin into a practical substance. Fortunately, Chain and Florey were co
recipients of the Nobel Prize in regards to penicillin but it was difficult for them
to fathom why Fleming was basking in glory. Fleming’s main contribution was
simply observing the original mold. He had little inkling that the mold could be
as medicinally important as it turned out to be. It had taken a team of scientists
to turn the discovery into something really worth being excited about and the
least amount of credit was going to them.
There is no evidence that Alexander Fleming purposely took credit for
anything that he did not do. Numerous quotes suggest he insisted that he ‘didn’t
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make penicillin...nature made it, he just discovered it.’ The ambiguity found
when researching this topic suggests the publicity was simply media driven and
Fleming, not knowing how to handle the situation, decided to go with it. This
circumstance where one scientist develops another’s discovery, bringing it to
full potential, is a difficult one because the line for credit becomes blurred and
it becomes dependent on the public to decide based on the information provided.
Perhaps in the end the constant fame and publicity given to Fleming gave Florey
the opportunity to focus on developing penicillin and was therefore a good thing.
Because Fleming is enshrined in encyclopedias and books everywhere as the
‘penicillin m an’ and the ‘good doctor Fleming,’ it is unlikely public knowledge
will be enhanced much beyond that. The scientific and medicinal circles will
always have the opportunity to debate this issue but as always it will forever come
down to the mold.
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The Battle o f Germantown:
A Forgotten Fight for Philadelphia and Freedom
Tony Giammarco
Throughout the past three years, my teammates and I have crossed streets
and fields that have bore witness and stood as seldom noticed monuments to an
event that has helped to define our nation’s momentous past. As a member of the
LaSalle University Cross-Country Team, our daily routine, a brisk nine-mile run,
takes us through the heart of historic Germantown. Turning left from Belfield
Avenue, we begin our ascent up Church Lane. Reaching its summit, we then make
a right onto the cobblestones of Germantown Avenue. After another quick left, we
find ourselves on Schoolhouse Lane and on our way to the wooded trails of Valley
Green. On the way to our final destination, we cross streets named Greene, Wayne,
and Cliveden. Although my teammates and I have made this trek countless times,
I wonder if any of them realize the historical significance of their surroundings. Do
any of them take into consideration the great sacrifices made by many men their age
upon the streets that they now shuffle along? Unfortunately, I fear the answer to this
question is no.
The Germantown of today looks little like it did during the late 18th century.
Now expanding on both sides of Germantown Avenue for miles, the once small
village has grown to a small city within a city. Choked with buses and strangled with
decrepit row homes, the image of Washington and Howe’s Germantown, with its
stately stone mansions, rich farmland, and vast orchards, has been lost forever.
More importantly, and perhaps more disturbing, the very events that took place in
Germantown, which helped to shape the outcome of the American Revolution,
might very well be lost as well, hidden under the trash and blocked from view by
the burnt our buildings that cover modern day Germantown.
Although there are few plaques or statues commemorating the events of
October 4, 1777, the blood spilt by American patriots on the streets and fields of
Germantown is no less significant than that of more heralded places like Bunker
Hill or Yorktown. In the early morning hours of October 4, over 200 years ago,
American forces, of both the Continental army and militia, valiantly attacked
encamped British and Hessian troops. For hours, the American forces struggled
against the early morning darkness, fog, and unfamiliar terrain in a courageous
attempt to dislodge the British and Hessian troops stationed at Germantown.
Ultimately, the outcome of the battle was unfavorable for the Americans. However,
even in defeat, the brash and tireless American forces displayed to the world
that their farmer led uprising was for real.
Outnumbered and poorly equipped, the American army could have never
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defeated the British without foreign assistance. The Battle of Germantown, along
with the American victory at Saratoga, secured a Franco-American alliance that
proved absolutely crucial for the success of the American Revolution. For this
reason, the events leading up to and of the Battle of Germantown must be brought
to light. History has proven to be unkind to the soldiers that fought and died at
Germantown, little has been written in textbooks and even less has been discussed
in schools across the country about the battle. Any individual that takes pride in
the actions and sacrifices made by patriotic Americans throughout the centuries
on days like October 19, 1781, July 4, 1863, or June 6, 1944, must be properly
informed about the events of October 4, 1777.
By 1777, the Americans and British has tasted both victory and defeat.
The Americans, under the generalship of George Washington, had been decimated
at Brooklyn, but had also scored opportunistic victories at Princeton and Trenton.
As for the British, after experiencing early troubles at Lexington and Concord,
they had rallied to capture strategically important New York City. Prior to
spending the winter of 1776-1777 in the comfort of New York City, the
British had devised a plan that they believed would win the war. Their plan called
for the isolation of various regions throughout the country. General Burgoyne,
commanding the British army of the North, would march down from Canada in
an attempt to capture Albany in order to isolate New England. While Burgoyne
made his way towards Albany, the British Southern army, under General Howe,
would attempt to secure Philadelphia. The British believed that if the capital was
under occupation and New England isolated, the Americans would lose their will
to fight and surrender. (Jackson, 3)
While the British prepared to implement what they believed to be their
war ending campaign of 1777, Washington and his army spent the winter of
1776-1777 in the less hospitable confines of Morristown, New Jersey, vigilantly
watching the British forces in New York City. Sensing a British invasion
sweeping down from Canada, General Gates and the Northern army prepared
to meet Burgoyne in upstate New York. By June of 1777, Howe had not
yet departed New York City for Philadelphia. Parliament, becoming increasingly
weary of the American rebellion and its costs, desired a hasty conclusion to
the conflict. Hoping to fulfill King George 111 and Parliament’s wishes, Howe
finally set off for Philadelphia. (Jackson, 5)
As the British were boarding ships in Sandy Hook, New Jersey destined
for the Chesapeake Bay area, Washington was already aware of their movement,
but not their destination. He later received information that the British 256-ship
flotilla, the largest ever assembled in America, was sailing south down the
Atlantic coast. Maintaining the British within sight for most of their journey,
Washington’s 11,000-man army humped their way from northern New Jersey to
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Wilmington, Delaware, approximately 20 miles south of Philadelphia. After several
miserable weeks at sea, Howe and 17,000 British troops landed at Head of Elk,
Maryland. In an attempt to save time lost at sea, Howe quickly organized his army
for their march north towards Philadelphia. During all this excitement, a nervous
Continental Congress, residing in Philadelphia, watched, waited, and listened while
Washington scrambled to position his troops between Howe and the city. (Jackson, 7)
For weeks after their landing, the British made their way north from
Maryland towards Philadelphia. Small groups of militia confronted the British
along their journey and only a few light skirmishes broke out. Easily sweeping past
the bands of militia, the British continued their drive towards the American capital.
However, on September 11, British and American forces clashed along the
Brandywine Creek in Pennsylvania. The plan was to confront and defeat the
British before they ever reached Philadelphia. Unfortunately, the Americans were
unsuccessful in thwarting the British advance towards the city. After the engage
ment, the British encamped on the battlefield as the Americans regrouped and
fled for Chester, Pennsylvania. Finding little refuge in Chester and in no condition
for another battle, Washington and his battered army crossed the Schuylkill River
and marched along its east bank to the Falls of Schuylkill near Germantown.
Guarding against a British surprise attack, General Wayne and a detachment of
1500 troops remained on the west side of the Schuylkill. With Philadelphia’s
comforting church steeples in sight and only a few miles down river, Washington’s
troops begrudgingly followed Washington north along the river. (Gifford, 69)
Washington ordered Wayne and his men to cut off the British baggage
train and to harass the British rear guard. By September 20, Wayne, believing
his position was undetected by the British, planned an attack for the next day.
Unfortunately for Wayne and his troops, his position was given away by the
smoke of their campfires and by Tory farmers. (Gifford, 75) British forces,
under General Grey, stealthily approached the small group of unsuspecting
American troops. General Grey ordered his men to use only swords and
bayonets in an attempt not to give away their position with loud volleys of
musket fire. The Americans were taken completely by surprise and suffered
heavy losses. Although many troops were taken prisoner, the British use of
the bayonet, which the Americans considered somewhat barbaric, led the public
to perceive the incident as a massacre. (Gifford, 76)
Following what came to be known as the Paoli Massacre, the British
were able to move virtually unmolested up and down the banks of the
Schuylkill River. On September 26, British and Hessian forces paraded into
Philadelphia. Writing in her diary, British Loyalist and Philadelphia resident,
Sarah Fisher remarked that she “rose very early this morning in hopes of seeing
a most pleasing sig h t... First came the light horse, led among by Enoch Story and
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Phineas Bond, as the soldiers were unacquainted with the town and the different
streets, nearly 200 I imagine in number, clean dress and their bright swords
glittering in the sun. After that came the foot, headed by Lord Cornwallis. Before
him went a band of music, which played a solemn tune and which I afterward
understood was called “God Save great George our King.” Then followed the
soldiers, who looked very clean and healthy and a remarkable solidity was on
their countenances, no wanton levity, or indecent mirth, but a gravity well
becoming the occasion seemed on all their faces. After that came the artillery
and then the Hessian grenadiers.” (Gifford, 85)
Meanwhile, Washington, after receiving several thousand reinforcements,
moved his army from Schwenksville, Pennsylvania, down the Skippack Road and
encamped sixteen miles from Germantown. Determined to attack the British army
at Germantown, Washington called a Council of War on September 28. By a
vote of ten to five, Washington’s council suggested that the army should move
within twelve miles of Germantown to await more reinforcements. (Jackson, 29)
Then, on October 2, Washington received very favorable information. He learned
that Howe had sent 3000 men to Elkton in an attempt to gather supplies and
another 3000 men were in Philadelphia under Cornwallis. In addition, the 10th
and 42nd Regiment had been sent into New Jersey in order to capture a fort
along the Delaware River. The council, upon receiving this information,
decided that it was now time to attack Howe. (Gifford, 86)
Washington designed a plan that called for a four-pronged attack against
Howe’s position in Germantown. Although impressive on paper, his plan
was extremely complicated and a bit naive. Washington’s plan called for: “The
Divisions of Sullivan and Wayne, flanked by Conway’s Brigade, were to enter
the Town by way of Chestnut Hill, while General Armstrong, with the
Pennsylvania Militia should fall down the Manatawny Road by Vandeerings
Mill and get upon the Enemy’s left and rear. The Divisions of Greene and
Stephen, flanked by McDougal’s Brigade, were to enter by taking a circuit by
way of the Lime Kiln Road at the Market House and to attack their Right
wing, and the Militia of Maryland and Jersey under Generals Smallwood
and Foreman were to march by the Old York road and fall upon the rear of
their right. Lord Stirling with Nash and Maxwell’s Brigades was to form a
Corps de Reserve. (Jackson, 31) In order for the plan to be successful,
Washington’s four columns had to travel great distances in darkness and over
unfamiliar territory, separated by miles, with no form of communication, and
arrive at their destinations simultaneously within two miles of the British
pickets. Due to the inexperience of the American troops and officers,
successfully implementing this plan was virtually impossible. (Gifford, 87)
At seven o’clock in the evening on October 3, the American forces began to march
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along their various routes towards Germantown. For days prior to the battle,
Washington has sent out mounted patrols to harass British outposts. Washington
hoped that because of these mounted patrols, the appearance of American forces on
October 3 would not create undue alarm within the British ranks. Unfortunately,
before the first shots were even fired, the Americans suffered a huge setback. The
Maryland and New Jersey militias, under Smallwood and Foreman, perhaps
confused by the unfamiliar terrain, wandered aimlessly along Old York Road.
Their meandering cost so much time that their arrival at Germantown was too late
to be a factor in the battle. (Jackson, 32)
Despite this setback, the Americans were able to capture the upper hand
during the early stages of the battle. General Conway’s brigade was the first to
engage the British at Mt. Airy. Their attack forced the British back, but not
before their field guns alarmed the remainder of the British forces in Germantown.
(Gifford, 88) After a brief British counterattack, Wayne’s division, eager to
avenge the Paoli Massacre, began to cut down scores of British troops. The
British began to retreat while Wayne’s men gave chase. Later, Wayne wrote:
“Our people, remembering the action of the night of the 20th o f September,
pushed on with their bayonets, and took ample vengeance for that night’s work.
Our officers exerted themselves to save an many of the poor wretches, but to
little purpose; the rage and fury of the soldiers were not to be restrained for some
time, at least not until great numbers of the enemy fell by their bayonets.
(Gifford, 89)
As the frightened and confused British scampered back towards
Germantown, Colonel Musgrave, along with 120 British troops barricaded
themselves in Benjamin Chew’s country house, Cliveden. The events that
followed proved to be the turning point of the battle. Musgrave and his men
closed the heavy wooden shutters and gathered every available piece of
furniture in front of the house's doorways. A few British troops were posted
by the doorway on the first floor while the remainder of the men crouched
below windows on the upper floors. After Musgrave delivered an
impassioned speech, the British troops prepared to defend their “castle”
against an impending American siege. (Gifford, 90)
Re-enactment of the battle of Germantown
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At this point during the battle, a heavy fog descended upon the
low-lying village of Germantown and the surrounding area. Stumbling
their way through the thick mixture of fog and smoke, General Sullivan’s
division made their way past the virtual British fortress at Cliveden
and began firing at every moving apparition that appeared or was believed
to have appeared. Angered by this wasteful use of precious ammunition,
Washington sent Timothy Pickering to settle down Sullivan and his men.
After meeting with Sullivan, Pickering made his way back to Washington and
discovered Musgrave and his men inside the Chew house. Pickering delivered the
information of his discovery to Washington and advised him to leave a small
detachment behind to deal with Musgrave and his men. On the contrary, General
Henry Knox told Washington “It would be unmilitary to leave a castle in our rear.”
(Gifford, 91)
Despite Pickering’s pleas, Washington was persuaded by Knox.
Lieutenant Colonel Matthew Smith of Virginia volunteered to deliver the summons
of surrender to Musgrave. Unfortunately, while carrying a flag of truce, Smith
was cut down by a British musket ball. Enraged, the Americans quickly
surrounded Cliveden while Knox positioned artillery pieces directly in front of
the house. A hail of musket balls and grape pounded Cliveden’s formidable
stonewalls and blasted through its wooden shutters and doors. However, the
British remained inside. While British blood splattered the interior walls and
spilt on the floor, the blood of Americans painted the lawn surrounding the house
a deep red. Whether attempting to enter the house or trying to light it on fire,
courageous Americans were cut down by British troops raining fire down from
Cliveden’s upper floors. (Gifford, 94)

Cliveden (Cliveden of the National Trust)
Washington’s decision to attempt to dislodge the British from Cliveden
cost precious time and valuable American lives. Meanwhile, Sullivan and his
men made their way towards the British center on the west side of Germantown

The Histories, Vol. 2, No. 1

Page 17

Road (now Germantown Avenue) as Wayne and his men traveled down the
eastside. Due to the heavy fog, both Sullivan and Wayne made their way past
Cliveden without noticing the battle that raged around it. At the same time,
General Greene, along with two-thirds of the American army, had already
reached the British center at Market House. (Gifford, 95) Unfortunately,
General Adam Stephen, who was reported to have been drunk at the time of
the battle, diverted his force away from Greene’s right wing and started
towards the noise coming from Cliveden. Amidst the thick fog, Stephen’s
men encountered Wayne’s force and began to fire upon them, mistaking them
for the British.
Believing to be under heavy enemy fire, Wayne’s division broke ranks
and began to flee. Pushing their way forward, Sullivan’s men battled their way
towards the British center to meet up with Greene. Unfortunately, Sullivan
and his men ran out of ammunition and were forced to join Wayne in retreat.
Instead of chasing after the retreating Americans, the British decided to focus
their attention on Greene. (Gifford, 96) Despite many setbacks, Greene and
his men were fighting very well. If Sullivan and Wayne remained in the fight,
the Americans would have been able to pin the British against the banks
of the Schuylkill River. Instead, with Sullivan and Wayne being forced to
retreat, the British were able to muster their full force against Greene. Hungry,
tired, and short of ammunition, Greene and his men began a fighting retreat. (Gifford,
97) Despite encouraging pleas from Washington, the inexperienced American
forces were unable to reorganize for a counterattack. At this point, realizing defeat,
Washington reluctantly sent out couriers to all commands ordering a general
withdrawal. (Gifford, 101)
After the battle, the British remained in Germantown while the Americans
retreated towards Schwenksville. The victorious British reported 4 officers and 66
men killed, 30 officers, and 396 men wounded, and 1 officer and 13 men missing.
The defeated Americans reported 30 officers and 122 men killed, 117 officers
and 404 men wounded, and approximately 400 missing. Although the British
were victorious, the battle proved to be an ultimate success for the Americans.
News of the battle spread to Europe and more importantly France. The French,
covertly supporting the Americans with supplies throughout the war, were now
leaning towards openly supporting the weary Americans. (Jackson, 50)
By late 1777, the French had received news about both Germantown and
Saratoga and they were very pleased with what they heard. French diplomats
learned that in the north, General Gates had surrounded General Burgoyne
and forced his surrender. They believed that this victory had raised American
spirits throughout the continent and had disheartened the British. (Murphy, 58)
The French also believed that Washington scored a near victory at Germantown.
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French diplomats were told that if the smoke and fog had not created disorder
amongst the American forces, the British would have been defeated. More
important to the French, the Battle of Germantown demonstrated that the
British attempt to crush the Americans during the campaign of 1777 was a
failure in the northern as well as the central theaters of the war. The battle also
displayed that the Americans would be a welcomed addition to the French
who were preparing to make the Revolutionary War a world war. (Murphy, 64)
A young British officer, Wilfred Owen, once penned these poetic
words shortly before his death in the First World War:
If in some smothering dreams you too could pace /
Behind the wagon that we flung him in, /
And watch the white eyes writhing in his face, /
His hanging face, like a devil’s sick of sin; /
If you could hear, at every jolt, the blood /
Come gargling from the froth-corrupted lungs, /
Obscene as cancer, bitter as the cud /
O f vile, incurable sores on innocent tongues- /
My friend, you would not tell with such high zest /
To children ardent for some desperate glory, /
The old Lie: Dulce et decorum est /
Pro patria mori. (Kennedy and Gioia, 41)
This old line that Owen refers to in Latin at the closing of his poem is “It is sweet
and fitting to die for one’s country.” The Americans that fell and bled the ground
red along the streets of Germantown believed in this ancient Latin axiom. They
felt that the ultimate sacrifice they were laying before the altar of freedom would
make their home a better place to live in for the one they loved. What they did not
realize was the fact that their sacrifices would help to create a country that would
become a beacon for life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
October 4, 1777 was a huge milestone in the life of young America.
Throughout the colonies, there was a belief that the revolution would be a success.
Many Americans believed that they could fight toe to toe with the British,
however, most of Europe did not. The Battle of Germantown changed the
opinions of many Europeans and the Americans quickly garnered the respect and
admiration of many foreign nations. If the events of October 4 had never taken
place, the Americans might have found themselves fighting a war against a
world power by themselves, hopelessly outnumbered and under supplied.
Fortunately, the Battle of Germantown was fought and the heroic sacrifices made
by many Americans on that day changed the course of the war and American
history forever.
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Hitler's character and its impact on Operation Barbarossa
Matthew Kowalski
On June 22,1941, Adolf Hitler launched Operation Barbarossia, his invasion
of the Soviet Union, which he looked upon as the fulfillment of his life’s mission.
When assessing the German invasion of the Soviet Union, most historians will point
to the immense geographic and logistical disadvantages faced by the Germans as the
main reasons for the campaign’s failure. This said, many of these disadvantages could
have been nullified, if not for a series of blunders committed by Adolf Hitler during the
opening phases of Operation Barbarossa. Almost every one of these strategic
blunders were results of deeply rooted flaws in Hitler’s character. These major flaws
were his inflated beliefs in his skills as a military tactician and his program of wagging
a war of annihilation on racial and ideological terms. Both of these would prove to be
disastrous in the key early months of the Russian campaign, when the German army
could have defeated the Soviet Union before it could harness its advantages in
manpower and greater industrial output. Rather Hitler’s flawed decision-making in
this key opening stage of the invasion negated the potential for a quick victory which
he needed and resulted in a long war of attrition that Germany simply had no hope of
winning.
Before examining Hitler’s impact on the course on the Russian campaign, we
must first explore what forged his character. The roots of the racial worldview that
shaped his character, and indeed the invasion of Russia itself, can be found in his
formative years and are summed up in his book Mein Kampf. This idea of seeking
lebensraum {living space} at the expense of the Slavs, whom he considered
untermench {sub-human}, was not an original one. This is made clear in this quote,
“other Germans, other Europeans, had talked and written in racist terms before Hitler;
but he alone set about translating ideology into action.” {Bullock 415}
This said, we must conclude that Hitler’s racism was inherited from the
intellectual movements of the late 19th century, which he was first exposed to during
his time in Vienna from 1908-13. Indeed, in Mein Kampf he clearly states the
importance of this period of his life in his proclamation that, “during this time I
formed the basic picture of the world and ideology which has become the granite
foundation of my deeds.” {Hitler 50} The Austro-Hungarian Empire, of which Hitler
was a product, was in a state of decay with its large non-German minorities
clamoring for greater autonomy. For the zealous German nationalists of the day, the
future survival of the Teutonic race lied in the colonization and exploitation of the
lands to the east. To support their rhetoric, they looked toward the “scientific racism”
implied in the philosophy of Social Darwinism. This perversion of Darwin’s theory of
survival of the fittest, concluded that races like all other living things were engaged in
a struggle against one another. As in Darwin, one race will prevail in this struggle
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because it is biologically superior. In the hands of proto-Nazis, like the racial
theorists Adolf Lanz and the geopolitical scientist Karl Haushofer, this biologically
superior race was applied to the Germanic peoples. All of this would have had a great
impact on the impressionable young artist Adolf Hitler, who at the time was jobless
and searching for meaning. The notion that there was a “hierarchy of races” would go
far to help alleviate the young Hitler’s own personal sense of inferiority.
The impact of this racial worldview that Hitler had first absorbed in Vienna,
and then expanded upon, would become apparent in his assessment and conduct of
the war in Russia. One result of this deep-rooted facet of Hitler’s character was his
fatal under-estimation of his Soviet adversary. In his book Operation Barbarossa.
Bryan Fugate states that “ the narrow-minded Nazi prejudice about the Russian
people were perhaps the single biggest problem to overcome.” {Fugate 75} In the eyes
of Hitler, the Soviet Union was inherently weak due to the fact that “Bolshevism
had robbed the Russian people of those Germanic organizers who had created the
Russian state and replaced them with that ferment and of decomposition.” }Rich 210}
This rabid racism, plus the poor performance of the Red Army in the Finnish
campaign of 1939-40 and in the opening months of Operation Barbarossa, led Hitler
to the conclusion that the war in the East would last five months at the most.
The truth of the matter was that the Red Army’s early setbacks, were due
more to the disastrous effects of Stalin’s purges of his military leadership in the mid
thirties, then to the actual quality of the Soviet fighting man. The Germans would
soon learn that when led by competent officers, such as a Marshall Zhukov, the Red
Army was just as effective a fighting force as the Wehrmacht. Also, the assertion
that victory could be achieved in a relatively short period of time only served to
blind Hitler to the reality of preparing for a possible winter campaign. On three
separate occasions Field Marshall von Brauchitisch requested that winter clothing
be issued to the troops. However, every time the matter was brought up, Hitler
assured him that victory would be achieved before winter set in.
The other major blunder that came as a result of Hitler’s racism, was the
failure of the Germans to utilize the dissatisfaction of significant portions of the
Soviet population to harsh Stalinist rule to their own advantage. In his work How
Hitler Could Have Won World War Two. Bevin Alexander is of opinion that of all
of Hitler’s blunders, “his most disastrous error was to go into the Soviet Union as a
conqueror, instead of a liberator.” }Alexander 81} In the early months of
war in the East, many segments of the Soviet population saw the German invasion
as a deliverance from the terror of the Stalin regime. This attitude was particularly
prevalent in the areas that had only recently been brought under Soviet control
under the terms of the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939. In the Baltic Republics and
the western Ukraine, there existed strong separatist movements that the Germans
could have used to their own ends. It is very conceivable that had Hitler sought to
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exploit these sentiments, “ the Bolshevik regime itself may have disintegrated, as the
Tsarist armies had in l917.” {Shirer 939} Some have even gone so far as to estimate
that a “German policy of liberation would have been enough to assure a complete
German victory in 1914 or 1942.” {Dupuy 95}
All this said, however, Hitler’s conviction that the Slavs were an inferior
people, compromised what could have been one of the best opportunities the
Germans had in defeating the Soviet Union in a quick campaign. Hitler saw the war
against Russia as the fulfillment of his dream for the attainment of “lebensraum.”
As far as he was concerned the Slavic population would have to be systematically
decreased, in order to make way for the future German settlement. Hitler’s Reich's
Commissar for the Eastern Territories, Alfred Rossenberg, best sums up this policy
by his quote, “we see no reason for any obligation on our part to feed the Russian
people with the products of that surplus territory.” This policy of exploitation and
repression automatically negated the positive impact of the strong anti-Stalin
sentiments of many Soviet citizens, as it simply replaced one form of terror with
another. The results of this policy in military terms was that what could have been a
wide degree of active support on the part of the Russian population, instead became
a greater desire to resist manifesting itself in the form of partisan warfare. A war was
waged behind the lines that not only threatened the German’s over-extended lines of
communication and supply, but also tied -down additional troops which where
needed in the frontlines.
After dealing with the blunders attributed to Hitler’s racial views, we must
now examine the elements of his character that influenced his military decision
making. The first of these aspects which needs to be looked at is Hitler’s firm belief
in his military genius. This inflated view of his skills was deeply rooted in the
success of the Werhmacht’s previous campaigns, particularly in the west in the
spring of 1940. His general staff, in planning the invasion of France, had been
wrong in their assessment of where best to strike at the Allies. Their reworking of
the old Schlieffen Plan lacked imagination, while the Manstein strategy adopted by
Hitler, led to German victory in less then six weeks. As Bevin Alexander puts it,
“the adoption of the Manstein Plan by Hitler, was the best decision he ever made.”
{Alexander 7} This and the slew of other successes, such as the move into the
Rhineland in 1936, in which Hitler’s decisions proved correct as opposed to the
assessments of his generals, had infused him with a sense of arrogance.
Hitler’s inflated opinion of his own military greatness may also have been
a result of his experience in the First World War and his long held mistrust of the
German military elite. As a frontline soldier in the trenches Hitler always had been
under the impression that “he the humble veteran knew more about the conduct of
war than the generals.” {Overy 274} After all, was it not these same members of the
military elite who had during the course of Great War, questioned his leadership
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qualities? Their assessment of the then Lance corporal Hitler was that he was “too
moody to ever rise to a position of leadership,” regardless of his impressive war
record. It could be assumed that this feeling of being snubbed might have had a
profound impact on Hitler’s future relationship with his generals. His domination of
staff conferences and stifling of any independent thought but his own, may have been
as Field Marshall von Ricnthofen put it, “sweet revenge for the ex-corporal.”
{Overy 277}
All this said, however, Hitler had practically no real experience at military
leadership. His decision making was not based on any practical military thought
process, but rather a combination of his belief in the ability of the German fighting
man to overcome adversity and a habit of reckless gambling at the expense of an
overall strategy. All of these facets of Hitler’s military thinking contributed in some
way to the execution of the invasion of Russia. His belief in the “will” of the
German fighting men, a result of his racial outlook, was to form the basis of Hitler’s
policy of strategic withdrawals, which was simply that they were not allowed. The
very thought of yielding ground to the enemy, even when it made more strategic
sense to do so was absolutely repugnant to Hitler. It was his opinion that simply by
their sheer courage the German soldier would somehow always win the day, even
under intense pressure. The results of this “stand and die” defense were only the
senseless waste of men and material. Hitler, however, failed to see the coastlines of
this strategy. When approached by General Guderian about this problem he replied,
“Do you think Frederick the Great’s grenadiers were anxious to die? They wanted to
live too, but the king was right in asking them to sacrifice themselves. I too am
entitled to ask any German soldier to lay down his life.” {Bullock 737}
Another of Hitler’s character traits that effected his ability to lead effectively
was his inability to balance his role as both a military and political leader. Hitler, for
all his political skill was never able to effectively fit into the model of an effective
wartime commander and chief. Rather then laying out an overall strategy and leaving
the military details up to the professionals, in the fashion of a Roosevelt or Churchill,
Hitler was obsessed with the most minute details of waging war. Regularly at
conferences “Hitler interfered with the smallest details of battle; regiments and air
squadrons were moved on the instructions of the Supreme Commander.” {Overy 277}
The results of this meddling was that, “instead of an overall strategy Hitler
substituted a jumble of individual decisions and orders.” {Overy 277}
Finally, the two character traits that had the greatest impact on Hitler’s
execution of the war in Russia, was his habit of opportunistic gambling. From the
very beginnings of his career, Hitler had showed himself to be both a gambler and
an opportunist. From the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact to the invasion o f France, he
had always been willing to seize an opportunity if he felt it would fulfill his aims.
Hitler’s opportunistic nature is best summed up in the statement that, “ once
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embroiled in a camp, he was ready to toss away even his general goal to seize an
opportunity that appeared.’’{Alexander 98} So far, this policy of reckless gambling
had resulted in nothing but success. In the war in the East, however, Hitler’s
persistent opportunism most likely compromised Germany’s best chance of
achieving victory in a quick campaign.
Hitler’s Operation Barbarossa on paper

During the operational planning of invasion of the Soviet Union, Hitler’s
generals were of the opinion that Moscow was to be the campaign’s overall goal. This
strategy made logical military sense, due to the centralized nature of the Stalin
regime. Moscow was for all intensive purposes the nerve center of the entire Soviet
Empire. It was from this epicenter of the Soviet Union, where all governmental policy
was formulated and then distributed. The fall of Moscow would then mean, “if not
the complete crumbling of the entire Union, at least the paralysis of her effective
resistance, owing to the chaos in communication and administrative life.” {Anders
23} This said Hitler, who never appreciated the strategic importance of the Soviet
capital to begin with, delayed the drive on Moscow by recklessly committing
divisions to other sectors of the front.
The prime example of this was his decision to move the bulk of Army
Group B’s panzers to the Ukraine, which were rapidly advancing towards Moscow,
for the assault on Kiev in late August. This move has been classified as being, “one
of the greatest examples in history of how a leader can be reduced by a vision of
short term gain into abandoning a course of action that would have given him
victory.” {Alexander 98} His reasoning for this sudden change in strategy was not
the product of sound military judgment, although there was a large concentration
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of Red Army units were defending the city, but rather pure opportunism. Hitler simply
just could not resist the temptation of possibly encircling an entire Soviet army group.
Indeed, the number of prisoners taken following the German victory at Kiev was
staggering, numbering some 665,000 men.
Hitler’s Panzer Divisions

This said, however, it delayed the drive on Moscow, which was by far the
more important strategic objective. By the time Hitler ordered the resumption of the
drive on Moscow, on September 30lh, he had given the Soviets time to prepare an
ample defense for the city. The assault on Kiev also wasted precious men and
material that would have been better used in the assault on Moscow, at a time when
the German supply lines were becoming increasingly overextended. Although by
far the most serious consequence of Hitler’s decision to delay the drive on Moscow,
this meant that German troops would run the risk of failing to capture the city
before the onset of winter. This unanticipated eventuality was why the German army
had to stop its advance in December, within sight of the Kremlin. The German
assault on Moscow, code named Operation Typhoon, was first slowed by muddy roads
in October and then finally ground to a halt by the snow and subzero temperatures of
the Russian winter.
Russia’s greatest ally during Hitler’s Invasion: The Winter
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The brunt of the blame for the failure to capture Moscow, and conceivably
ending the war on the Eastern Front, squarely rests on the shoulders of Adolf Hitler.
It was his decision to halt the drive on the Soviet capital and gamble at Kiev that
doomed the prospects of Germany achieving victory in 1941. Bevin Alexander’s
comment that, “at Kiev Germany won a great local victory, but surrendered its last
chance to the win the war” {Alexander 99}, best sums up this fatal blunder. The
missed opportunity to capture Moscow before winter meant simply that Germany was
now faced with a longer war in the East, which it could not win. The massive
advantages in manpower and industrial production possessed by the Soviets would
eventually overpower the Third Reich.
In conclusion, the defeat of Nazi Germany on the Eastern Front was due to
several factors. The operation itself was an immense gamble to begin with,
considering the immense advantages the USSR possessed in size, population, and
industrial capability. This said the ability of the German armed forces to achieve
victory was severely compromised by decisions made by Hitler during the early
stages of the campaign. These blunders, among them the failure to exploit the
disenchantment of the Russian population with the Stalin regime and the costly
delay to press on to Moscow, were all direct results of flaws within Hitler’s own
character. Had Hitler not pursued his brutal racial policy toward the Slavs and
left the actual waging of the war to the military professionals, he may have
achieved his aim of a quick victory. Instead, he found himself embroiled in a
prolonged conflict in which Germany simply could not win. Antoine Henri
Jomini may have put it best when he observed, “Russia is a country that is
easy to get into, but very difficult to get out of.”
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Pius XII and the Holocaust Under His Very Windows
Matthew Smalarz
The Holocaust was one of the worst atrocities committed in all of human
history. Nazi propaganda was devoted to the destruction of Jewish communities and
culture during the 1930s and 40s. In January 1942, Hitler began his Final Solution
with every intention of wiping out every last remnant of Jewish life. From that
point on, the Nazis systematically murdered six million of the Jewish faith. While this
occurred, Pope Pius XII waited out the war in the Vatican. As Jews were butchered
in concentration camps, the Pope failed to intercede on their behalf. This is the
problem addressed in this paper. Did Pius XII attempt to save the Jewish population
in Europe or were his inactions responsible for the murders of six million Jews? The
purpose of this paper is to show Pius XII 's unwillingness to speak out against the
Holocaust. By failing to condemn the ongoing killings, Pius XII aided Nazi
Germany in its plan to extinguish European Jewry. In the final analysis, this paper
hopes to give an honest interpretation of the hidden truth of Pius XII 's
irresponsibility and anti-Semitic tendencies during the Holocaust.
For the first three years of World War II, the Final Solution was an idea Nazi
Germany was planning in secret. On January 3, 1939, Hitler delivered an address
about the Final Solution, an idea that would take two years to implement.
By June 1941, Reinhold Heydrich was asked to prepare for the Final Solution. In
other words, Hitler intended to arrest all European Jews and then send them off to
concentration camps. On January 20, 1942, the proposal was officially adopted and
by March the deportations began. This was the beginning of the end for six million
innocent Jews. (Mclnemy, 74)
During this time of human suffering, many turned to religion to cope with the
killing. The one person many Catholics turned to for answers about the extermination
of the Jews was Pope Pius XII. During 1942, Pius XII received a constant flow of
information concerning the Jewish deportations. The world anxiously awaited a
statement of condemnation from the Pope concerning the European Jews. Instead,
Pius remained silent. (Goldhagen, 24) To say that all Catholics were anti-Semitic,
however, is an incorrect statement. For example, Pius XII 's papal nuncio to
Germany, Orsenigo, tried desperately to prevent further deportations. (Mclnerny, 74)
Yet the Pontiff was indifferent to the demands made by world leaders to issue a
condemnation. It was believed only diplomatic pressure from the British and United
States would force the Pope to open up. Francis D’Arcy Osborne, the British
Foreign Officer in the Vatican, attempted repeatedly, without success, to get Pius to
speak out. (Cromwell, 281) Osborne noted the British public’s aggravation at Pius
XII’s reluctance to condemn the Holocaust. (Cromwell, 282) Likewise, Osborne’s
counterpart, Harold Tittman, the American envoy from the United States, tried
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repeatedly to get Pius to formally condemn the atrocities, but with no success. In both
men’s conversations with one another, Osborne and Tittman complained that Pius XII
was staying quiet because he either wanted the Axis to win or he was too afraid to
speak out on secular matters. (Cromwell, 283)
As the diplomatic pressure continued, news reports began to filter in about
the mass slaughtering of Jews. For example, on July 17, 1942, Apostolic Visitor
Giuseppe Ramiro Marcone informed the Vatican that 2 million Jews had already
been exterminated. (Zuccoti, 102) Reports were also being consistently filed
from Hungary, Switzerland, and Slovakia that Jews were being rounded up and
then sent off to the camps. (Phayer, 48)ln the Summer of 1942, hundreds of thousands
of Jews were deported from France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. On August 7, the
papal nuncio to Vichy, Valerio Valeri, sent a report to the Vatican that Jews were
being carried away on trains to Poland and the Ukraine. (Zuccotti, 103) In September
1942, Myron C. Taylor, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s special envoy to the Vatican, was
asked to deliver an important communique to the Pope regarding the fate of
European Jews. (Zuccotti, 104) There were two important proposals within this
message. First, the United States wanted to delay the Pope’s inclinations towards a
peace proposal with the Axis powers. (Cromwell, 289) Secondly, and most
importantly, was the Pope’s formal denunciation of the mass deportations and
killings of European Jews. Given the information the Vatican received, the
pressure to declare the killings morally unjust overwhelmed Pius XII. If Pius had
been more forthcoming, chances are the Allies’ reports about the Jewish
deportations may have been taken more seriously. (Cromwell, 286) Rather,
Cardinal Maglione, Secretary of State for the Vatican, stated his belief that,
“it has not been possible to verily the accuracy” of these sources. (Phayer, 48)
However, Pius XII decided to make a half-hearted effort by saying, “no year has
passed that We have not appealed in Our public utterances to all the belligerents ...
to show some feeling of pity and charity for the sufferings of civilians.” Nowhere
in this statement does Pius condemn the atrocities committed by Nazi Germany
against the Jews. (Cromwell, 290) The American envoy, Harold Tittmann even
said that he, “called attention to the opinion that the failure of the Holy See to
protest publicly against Nazi atrocities is endangering its moral prestige and
undermining faith both in the Chruch and in the Holy Father himself.”
(Friedlander, 118) The pope’s intransigence was now being perceived as a fatal
blow to the papacy’s prestige.
While the papacy continued its silence, one significant report revealed
convincing evidence of the Papacy’s denial of the events that were occurring.
Kurt Gerstein, a committed Protestant who singed on with the Waffen SS to
discover the cover-up of Nazi atrocities, was turned away by the Papal Nuncio
in Berlin. After this failed attempt, Gerstein gave the report to a Dr. Winter, who
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then handed it off to the Pope’s good friend, Bishop von Preysing of Berlin. It was
then sent to the Vatican. Meanwhile, two German Catholic spies, Dr. Hans Globke
and Dr. Josef Muller, handed over further evidence about the Jews to German
bishops. (Zuccotti, 108) In these reports, most specifically Gerstein’s, they provided
first hand accounts of mass executions of Jews in gas chambers. How could the
Papacy believe the accounts of gassings by a Waffen S.S. officer, let alone from two
German Catholic spies? (Friedlander, 129) The Vatican immediately dismissed the
fallacious accounts; it was becoming apparent that the Vatican felt no sympathy for
the Jewish people. (Phayer, 46)
What can be said for Pius XII’s reluctance to issue a formal statement
denouncing the Holocaust? First, we must look briefly into Pius XU’s past to see
why he acted the way he did. During the 1920s and 30s, Pius XII commanded two
of the most important diplomatic posts the Vatican had to offer; they were Papal
Nuncio to Germany and Secretary of State for the Vatican, respectively.
(Mclnerny, 20-21) Pius XII’s correspondences to the Vatican during this time
indicates his hatred of Jews. He even went so far as to associate the Jewish race
with Bolshevik ideology. (Goldhagen, 37) As an envoy, Pius XII never attempted to
sanction the German Catholic Church from issuing anti-Semitic statements.
(Cromwell, 296) Finally, Pius XII, in 1937, was responsible for writing the
encyclical Mil brennender Sorge. In this encyclical, the Church formally condemned
Nazi Germany’s policies. The encyclical reprimanded the Nazis for its intolerance
towards the Catholic Church, but not one word was uttered on behalf of the Jews.
What can be inferred from this document is that Pius, while not foreseeing the
destruction of the Jews, still believed the Jewish race was not worth saving.
(Goldhagen, 25) How can God’s human representative on Earth belittle a race
which had done no injustice to him? Quite simply, Pius’s anti-Semitism was more
forthright than initially thought. And for that reason, his pre-Papal background
laid the groundwork for some of the larger mistakes that he was about to make
involving the Jewish Holocaust.

Pacelli presides over the signing of the Reich Concordat at the Vatican on
July 20, 1933.
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After Taylor’s failed mission and the dismissal of Gerstein's report, Pius XII’s
concern now laid with Rome’s security. Osborne, the British envoy, wrote in his diary
in December 1942 that he was utterly disgusted by the Pope’s concern for Rome,
when so many Jews were being slaughtered. Pius XII hoped the Allies would not
bomb Rome, but if they did, “the pope would protest publicly.” (Phayer, 62-3) Pius
never responded in such a manner about the Jews. At the same time, Jewish
organizations from around the globe lobbied the Vatican to save its people. Montini,
the Secretary of State for the Vatican, informed these groups that the Vatican “was
doing all that it could.” (Cromwell, 291) Yet these statements flew in the face of
reality.
Before 1942 ended, one last attempt was made by Osborne to get the Pope
to denounce the killings. He asked the Pope to condemn the mass murders of
Jews in his Christmas Eve address to the world. Domenic Tardini, the pope’s
intermediary, told Osborne that “the Pope could not take sides.” The Allies
resorted to their last plan of action. The United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet
Union decided to issue a statement denouncing the extermination of the Jews.
The Pope was asked to sign. Even now, the Pope was afraid he might betray the
neutrality he believed in. (Chadwick, 217)

Pacelli broadcasts to the world with Giovanni Mantini, the future Paul
VI, at his left shoulder. His 1942 Christmas Eve broadcast was perceived
as a weak and hallow statement regarding the Nazi Final Solution.
The Pope’s Christmas Eve address is the only legitimate statement His
Holiness made condemning war atrocities. It is obvious that his objective was
to keep the statement as vague as possible for fear he might be portrayed as taking
sides. In the address, Pius says that, “the hundreds of thousands who, through
no fault of their own, only because of their nationality and descent, are condemned
to death.” (Mclnemy, 95) In this twenty-six page statement, only twenty-seven
words actually make reference to the Holocaust. Yet in those twenty-seven words,
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not one directly refers to the Jews. In an interview with Harold Tittmann, the
American envoy to the Vatican, he says Pius, “thought it was plain to everyone that
he was referring to the ... Jews ... when he declared that hundreds of thousands of
persons had been killed ... sometimes because of their race or nationality.”
Yet later on Tittmann admitted he was still confused by the vagueness of the
statement. (Friedlander, 133-34) In early 1943, Pius XII wrote to Bishop Preysing in
Berlin informing him that his message was clear, concise, and to the point. In reality,
his words failed to instruct the world about the Holocaust. And for that matter, the
most important group he tried to reach, the Jews, did not view it as a condemnation.
(Phayer, 49)

Pacelli tries to calm the Italian crowds during the bombing of Rome,
August 13, 1943.
In July 1943, the Allies began their assault up the Italian peninsula. Rome
was now under attack and there was little Pius could do. Mussolini’s government
had fallen from power, and Italy reverted back to a constitutional monarchy.
(Friedlander, 183) On September 11, German forces occupied the city and declared
martial law. Reports were coming in from across Italy that Italian Jews were being
deported to camps. (Zuccotti, 150) During this crisis, Pius was more or less
responsible for Rome’s inhabitants and its Jewish community. (Cromwell, 299)
The Jewish community in Rome, however, could not depend on the Pope’s
protection. Instead, the Germans intended to deport all the Jews in Rome. S.S.
Lieutenant Colonel Herbert Kappler, chief of the German security police in Rome,
was responsible for carrying out these orders. On September 26, however, Kappler
asked to meet with Rome’s Jewish leaders for an important meeting. Dante
Almansi (president of Union of Italian Jewish Communities) and Ugo Foa (president
of the Jewish Community in Rome) were given an ultimatum. Kappler was willing
to broker a deal that gave the Jews their lives; the Jews, however, had to hand over
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all their gold possessions for the sake of the German war effort. (Zuccotti, 153)
This seemed to solve the Jews’ problem, but they still had to muster 50 kilograms
of gold. As word spread, Jews from across the city brought their gold to Rome’s
synagogue on the banks of the Tiber. (Cromwell, 301) A great debate has ensued as
to Pius’s role throughout this episode. Defenders of Pius XII have said that he was
so disturbed by the German demand that he offered a gift of fifty kilograms of gold.
(Mclnerny, 116) This, however, is a lie. It was meant to be a loan and nothing more.
For that reason, it gave the Jewish community in Rome a sense of security from the
Pope that had never existed. The community continued to believe that the fifty
kilograms and the Pope’s assurances would save them from deportation.
(Zuccotti, 154)
The Germans, however, also lied about the safety of the Jews in Rome. After
the Jews had delivered the gold on September 28, the Germans entered the Jewish
officials* offices in Rome. They proceeded to steal 2 million lire as well as the names
and addresses of the Jewish community of Rome. (Zuccotti, 155) Unfortunately,
the Jews would be in for a greater shock on October 16. Adolf Eichmann, chief
of the Gestapo forces in Rome, ordered that the Jews of Rome be rounded up.
Under the command of SS officer Theodor Dannecker, the 365 S.S. and the Waffen
S.S. entered the Jewish ghetto. (Cromwell, 303) By 2:00 P.M., over 1,200 Jews
had been detained and sent to the Italian Military College, a little less than a half a
mile away from the Vatican. (Zuccotti, 155) Pius was immediately informed of the
roundup by Principessa Enza Pignatelli-Aragona, who ran to the Vatican to inform
the Pope. The Pope instantly contacted the German ambassador to the Holy See,
Ernst von Weizsacker. Weizsacker immediately went to meet with Secretary of
State Maglione about the roundups. At this meeting, Maglione explicitly asked
the German ambassador to take every measure necessary to stop the roundups.
But then Weiszacker asked Maglione, “What would the Holy See do if the events
continued?” Maglione replied, “the Holy See would not want to be put into the
necessity of uttering a word of disapproval.” In other words, Maglione believed
the Germans should handle the roundups and allow the Vatican to remain silent
on the issue. (Cromwell, 305)
However, the German diplomatic staff in Rome found the “resettlement”
of the Jews of Rome distasteful. The German ambassador to Italy, Eitel Friedrich
Mollhausen, decided that they needed to prevent the roundups. They decided to
write a letter to the German occupying forces in Rome through the hand of Bishop
Hudal, rector of the Collegia del Anima. In this letter, Hudal wrote that the Vatican
requested that the Germans discontinue the roundup of Jews. The interesting
thing is that the Vatican never informed Hudal to do such a thing.
(Phayer, 99-100) It was sent that evening of October 16 at 11:30. (Cromwell, 306)
As a last resort, Weizsacker also wrote a letter to the Foreign Office in Berlin,
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which stated that, “the Curia is dumbfounded, particularly as the action took
place under the very windows of the pope, as it were.” Weiszacker was trying to
convince the ministry that the Vatican would protest the further roundup of Jews.
Lastly, he requested that the Jews be kept to work in Italy. His pleas went
unheeded. (Zuccotti, 163)
By Monday, October 18, 1943, the deportations had already taken place. The
trains left Rome and headed out to the Apennine mountains, where frigid temperatures
swarmed the train cars. The Jews were treated horribly, receiving little food or water.
While this went on, the Vatican was updated frequently about the Jewish prisoners.
As the Jews were led to their deaths, Pius’s concern now rested with the fear of an
eventual Communist takeover in Rome. (Phayer, 101) In Pius’s opinion, the
Germans should make a concerted effort to prevent the Communists from tearing
Rome apart. Pius conveyed his feelings about the Germans to the American and
British envoys. To Harold Tittman, Pius said, “Germans had respected the Vatican
City and the Holy See’s property in Rome. When speaking to Osborne, the British
envoy, Pius thanked the German army for assuring the neutrality of the Vatican.
In the end, Pius overshadowed the plight of the Jews with his concern for the
security of Rome. Five days after the Jews left Rome, 1,060 of Rome’s Jews were
gassed at Auschwitz. Some 149 men and 47 were forced into servile labor. At the
war’s end, only 15 of Rome’s Jews had survived. In later roundups, another 1,084
would be sent to Auschwitz and Italian concentration camps, where few managed
to escape with their lives. (Cromwell, 309-310)
On October 25-26, 1943, an article in L ’Osservator Romano, otherwise
known as the “Voice of the Holy See” recognized Pius XII for his “paternal charity
... it might be said, ever more active; it knows neither boundaries nor nationality,
neither religion nor race.” (Friedlander, 208) These words did not convey the
feelings, however, of many of the diplomatic envoys to the Vatican. Osborne, the
British envoy, believed the Pope had failed to take a “strong line.” Likewise, the
Jesuit rescuer of Jews, Tacchi-Venturri, despised the Vatican for its failure to
approach the deportations in a more open and candid light. (Phayer, 101-102)
How could the Holy Pontiff, with his detractors so close to him, not feel shame
for his cowardly acts? As we are about to find out, Pius’s reluctance to save
hundreds of innocent Jews would come back to haunt him again in 1944.
By March 1944, the Final Solution had taken millions of Jewish lives.
The Germans continued to find pockets of Jewish populations that still needed
to be exterminated, such as the 670,000 Hungarian Jews. Eichmann, who had
been put in charge of rounding up the Italian Jews, now began his roundups in
Hungary. (Zuccotti, 293) The papal nuncio to Hungary, Angelo Rotta, made an
appeal on behalf of the Hungarian Jews to the newly appointed Hungarian
ministry. Cromwell points out that no Vatican representative had officially
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lobbied a protest during the war until now. (Cromwell, 325) Pius was receiving
pressure from the Allied Powers to denounce the deportation of Hungarian Jews.
Pius, however, only protested to the Hungarian dictator, Miklos Horthy, on June 25.
Horthy finally complied with the Pontiffs protest on July 9, at which point Hungary
had already been emptied of its Jewish population. If Pius XII had taken notice earlier,
he may have been able to save 437,000 Jewish victims from deportation and execution.
Instead, His Holiness only conformed to Ally pressure after he had been informed
that the Germans were losing the war. Pius, was more or less, waiting on the
sidelines to see which side he could align himself with. By becoming a political
pawn, he neglected the dire circumstances the Hungarian Jews had been placed in.
(Goldhagen, 24)
What can be said for Pope Pius XII and his lack of compassion for the
Jews of Europe? Based on the facts gathered, it is hard to refute the true nature of
Pius XII’s anti-Semitic tendencies. His inability to act as an honest arbiter on
behalf of all European Jews resulted in the loss of many innocent lives. How can
any God-loving Catholic believe their Holy Father to be so dishonest? As any
Catholic or good hearted religious person should know, we all sin. But some in the
Catholic faith tend to take the dogma of papal infallibility too far. Garry Wills points
out, “Catholics have fallen out of the healthy old habit of reminding each other
how sinful popes can be. Authoritative as a Pope may be by his office, he is not
impeccable as a man - he can sin, as can all humans.” (Wills, 1) Pope Pius XII
was a sinful pope. All popes have sinned. But does that make Pius XII any less
responsible for the deaths of those Jewish victims of the Holocaust, especially those
that were “under his very windows?” Sadly, there will be those that say Pius did
more than his part in saving Jewish lives, while his detractors will continue to
vilify the true nature of his actions. In the end, however, Pius XII must not answer
to us, but to the one true God he was meant to represent here on Earth.
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